This is the first edition of the Italian translation of J.A. Schumpeter’s last conference. The intervention analyzes the relationship between institutional change and capitalism with particular reference to the United States after the Second World War. It is at the same time a recapitulation of the most relevant Schumpeterian economic and political concepts. Translation and Introduction by Adelino Zanini: Of a "Private Writing". A Short Note on the Very Latest Schumpeter.

ABSTRACTSchumpeter’s theory of socialism pivots on his response to Ludwig von Mises’s claim that rational economic calculation is “impossible” in a socialist economy. Mises held that because socialism eliminates market prices for the means of production, it is impossible under socialism to know the relative scarcities of productive inputs, and thus to determine rationally which of any number of technologically feasible production projects to pursue. Schumpeter appears to assume away Mises’s epistemic concerns about socialism by contending that it is (...) theoretically possible to determine which goods should be produced in a socialist economy if all the relevant data are known—which begs the question Mises had asked. Did Schumpeter really commit such an elementary error of interpretation? Or was the appearance of doing so part of his attempt to communicate to the reader of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy a host of reservations about the likely consequences of socialism in practice, even as he ostentatiously praised its feasibility in principle? (shrink)

J. Schumpeter is a key figure, even a seminal one, on technological innovation. Most economists who study technological innovation refer to Schumpeter and his pioneering role in introducing innovation into economic studies. However, despite having brought forth the concept of innovation in economic theory, Schumpeter provided few if any analyses of the process of innovation itself. This paper suggests that the origin of systematic studies on technological innovation owes its existence to the economist W. Rupert Maclaurin from (...) MIT. In the 1940s and 1950s, Maclaurin developed Schumpeter’s ideas, analyzing technological innovation as a process composed of several stages or steps, and proposed a theory of technological innovation, later called the linear model of innovation. The paper also argues that Maclaurin constructed one of the first taxonomies for measuring technological innovation. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contribute to responsible innovation by developing a conceptual framework for the processes of creativity and innovation. The hypothesis is that creative and innovative processes are similar in that both are affective in nature. I develop this conceptual framework through an interpretation of the insights of Henri Poincaré’s notion of the ‘four stages’ in the creative process and Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of the entrepreneur. Building on this framework, I analyze the creative and innovative (...) practices of the film director Lars von Trier and the entrepreneur Steve Jobs. The interpretation and analysis suggest that the processes of creativity and innovation are similar in nature in that both are based on the moods of disturbance and enthusiasm; but that they differ in that creativity is based on the feelings of interest and irritation, whereas innovation is based on the feelings of desire and anger. In the conclusion I discuss the implications of this for responsible innovation with regard to the social aspect of resistance towards innovation and the ethical aspects of anger in entrepreneurial leadership. (shrink)

The precise nature of W. S. Jevons's utilitarianism as a guiding rule for economic policy has yet to be investigated, and that will be the first issue treated in this paper. While J. A. Schumpeter, for instance, asserted that ‘some of the most prominent exponents of marginal utility’, were ‘convinced utilitarians’, he did not investigate the further implications for Jevons's policy analysis.

In the discourse of the knowledge-based economy, the link between creativity and innovation is usually taken for granted. However, not only is this link of recent date, it joins together two diametrically opposed concepts: the economic concept of innovation and the humanistic concept of creativity. In research too, there is a lack of enquiry into the nature of the processes of creativity and innovation and into how these processes are similar yet different. Building on the original insights of Henri Poincaré (...) and Joseph Schumpeter, I present the hypothesis that creativity and innovation are similar in nature, not in regard to knowledge or skills, but in that both are ways of relating to the novel. My findings suggest, meanwhile, that creativity and innovation differ in that creativity is about experiencing the novel in the creative process, whereas innovation is about willing the novel as a strategy for the innovative process. Furthermore, my findings suggest that there exists a structural similarity between creativity and innovation and Aristotle’s concepts of practical and philosophical wisdom, in that innovation is a form of practical wisdom in regard to the novel, whereas creativity is a form of philosophical wisdom in regard to the novel. (shrink)

The paper challenges Joseph Salerno’s recent revisionist account in “The Place of Human Action in the Development of Economic Thought” of the relationship between Friedrich von Wieser and F.A. Hayek and of their views on equilibrium theory. The paper argues, contra Salerno, that Wieser was not a proponent of general equilibrium theory, so could not have influenced Hayek in the manner Salerno suggests; that there was not a concerted effort by Schumpeter, Wieser, Mayer, and Hayek to advocate general equilibrium (...) theory in the prewar and inter-war years among the Austrians; and finally, that Hayek’s early attraction to what he called “equilibrium analysis” had causes independent of those alleged by Salerno.Cet article récuse l’interprétation révisionniste récente de Joseph Salerno dans son article “The Place of Human Action in the Development of Economic Thought” à propos des relations entre Friedrich von Wieser et Friedrich Hayek, et de leurs visions au sujet de l’équilibre. S’inscrivant en cela en opposition avec ce qu’avance Salerno, cet article suggère que Wieser n’était pas un partisan de la théorie de l’équilibre général et, en conséquence, ne peut avoir influencé Hayek comme le suggère Salerno ; qu’il n’y a eu aucun effort concerté entre Schumpeter, Wieser, Mayer et Hayek pour promouvoir la théorie de l’équilibre général parmi les autrichiens durant les années d’avant-guerre et celles de l’entre-deux guerres ; et enfin, que l’intérêt du jeune Hayek dans ce qu’il appelait “l’analyse de l’équilibre” avait des causes autres que celles évoquées par Salerno. (shrink)

Winner of the Schumpeter Prize, 2000 and Winner of the Smith Prize in Austrian Economics, 2000, this book explores how the limitations of human knowledge create both opportunities and problems in the modern economy. The growing field of evolutionary economics has developed as a result of the traditional failure of the discipline to explain certain phenomena that impact greatly on the economy. These are: *_Evolution_ - the impact on the economy of natural change over time *_Institutions_ - the impact (...) on the economy of government and/or company policy, rules and regulations *_Knowledge_ - the impact on the economy that is felt when new information becomes available _Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics _is a punchy overview of these topics and one that has become regarded as something of a modern classic that no serious social sciences academic or student should be without. (shrink)

Economic models are founded in the idea of taking individuals' preferences as both known and given. This article explores the evolution of personal preferences, within a context of both entrepreneurial discovery and Objectivist philosophy. It begins by formalizing Ayn Rand's theory of Objectivism applied to human values, and continues by modeling preference changes similar to Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction—a process of self-discovery. Next the role of societal factors is examined in forming shared preference sets. Finally, the article describes (...) how the strength of human preferences is used to narrow choice sets in the presence of greater consumption options. (shrink)

This is a delightful book which tries to solve the puzzle of Nicomachean Ethics 5.5: did Aristotle make a contribution to economic theory or are his statements without significance? Meikle argues that what Aristotle does in this chapter is analyze a property of things, namely their exchange value. Such things as houses, horses, beds are not really commensurable, but the degree to which people need them is. Their value in money is the conventional representation of this need. However, Aristotle has (...) no theory of economic value. He regards the development of exchange as part of the emergence of the polis from the family and the village. The breeding of money from money is unnatural. Aristotle is concerned about the invasion of the whole political and ethical life by the pursuit of money. Those who condemn this position overlook that the criticism is aimed at the effect money has on the arts when they are pursued for the sake of it. While Marx endorses most of Aristotle’s conclusions, Schumpeter rejected the view that exchange values cannot be expressed in terms of use values. For Aristotle, exchange value is intrinsic; for positivists it is extrinsic. Meikle sides with Aristotle. He also defends Politics 1.5, a chapter which has often been dismissed as a muddle. Aristotle’s analysis of exchange value is a great achievement. The Stagirite investigated the conceptual problems that arise when one tries to define exchange value. How do things which are incommensurable become commensurable in exchange? (shrink)

Schumpeter's redefinition of representative democracy as merely leadership competition was canonical in postwar political science. Schumpeter denies that individual will, common will, or common good are essential to democracy, but he, and anyone, I contend, is forced to assume these conditions in the course of denying them. Democracy is only a method, of no intrinsic value, its sole function to select leaders, according to Schumpeter. Leaders impose their views, and are not controlled by voters, and this is (...) as it should be, he says. I respond that his leadership democracy is implausible, both descriptively and prescriptively. Competitive election is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of democracy, not sufficient even for the limited empirical purpose of regime classification. Any adequate definition of democracy must make reference to the common will, the common good, and other values, I submit. (shrink)

This article explores parallels between Marx's and Schumpeter's theories of capitalist development, and discusses the relationship of these classical approaches to later constructivist theories of technological and organizational changes. It is suggested that Marxian and Schumpeterian ideas could be combined in a way which remedies the weaknesses of both sides, and provides a better understanding of the innovative dynamics of capitalism; such a synthesis could then be linked to a constructivist model of the rise and fall of economic `myths'.

For a given decision, when an undemocratic procedure would result in a good outcome, and a democratic procedure would result in a bad outcome, which decision procedure ought we to use? Epistemic democrats, such as Joseph Schumpeter, argue that all else being equal, we should prefer the procedure with the good outcome. Schumpeter’s argument for this position is that we must reject the view that only democratic procedures matter when evaluating government institutions (pure proceduralism), and the only alternative (...) to pure proceduralism that can coherently describe the relationship between democracy and the public interest is pure instrumentalism. I argue that Schumpeter’s argument for epistemic democracy does not succeed. In this paper, I outline three alternative ways of conceiving of the relationship between democracy and the public interest, which I call evaluative dualism, impure instrumentalism, and impure proceduralism. I explain how, with any of these three alternative views, we can evaluate government institutions without rejecting the intrinsic value of democratic procedures or the public interest. (shrink)

Inspired by the recent rediscovery of work of Schumpeter in science and policymaking the author reviews and appraises Schumpeterian theory and that of his followers in innovation studies. Although Schumpeter’s vision suffers from some defects, I argue that there is more to learn from this author than his well-known idea of “creative destruction”. In particular, Schumpeter’s view on innovation policy is something that may have vital relevance to today’s increasingly policy-dominated world. We therefore conclude that besides his (...) key ideas on innovation-led development also his policy view should be regarded as a significant legacy in innovation studies. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSchumpeter’s highly influential theory of democracy, developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, is less a market-based theory of party competition than it is a theory of strong leadership, modeled after generalship. As such, it is a weak foundation for rebuilding a democratic theory of party politics. Moreover, Schumpeter’s demolition of the “Classical Doctrine of Democracy” knocks down a straw-man theory: a hybrid of Bentham’s utilitarianism and Rousseau’s communitarianism that few contemporary theorists of democracy would be willing to defend.

In this article, it is argued that existing democracies might establish popular rule even if Joseph Schumpeter’s notoriously unflattering picture of ordinary citizens is accurate. Some degree of popular rule is in principle compatible with apathetic, ignorant and suggestible citizens, contrary to what Schumpeter and others have maintained. The people may have control over policy, and their control may constitute popular rule, even if citizens lack definite policy opinions and even if their opinions result in part from elites’ (...) efforts to manipulate these opinions. Thus, even a purely descriptive, ‘realist’ account of democracy of the kind that Schumpeter professed to offer may need to concede that there is no democracy without some degree of popular rule. (shrink)

A short presentation of Schumpeter's work with spedial attention to its philophical backgroound.

Joseph Schumpeter's work has been all too selectively appropriated by public choice theorists. Schumpeter criticized the high level of rationality the classical model of democracy imputes to citizens, and he provided an alternative theory, inspiring rational choice theory and allowing for diverse forms of irrationality. Following in Schumpeter's footsteps I will discuss four problems: the deficient rationality of voters, politicians as ?political entrepreneurs,? leadership in democracy and the rise of the ?political class,? and the affinity between democracy (...) and capitalism. (shrink)

This article reinterprets Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship in a decidedly un-“Schumpeterian” way, and argues that continued emphasis on Schumpeter’s alleged glorification of the entrepreneur constitutes a missed opportunity for democratic critics of capitalism and neoliberalism. I demonstrate that Schumpeter did not exalt the individual entrepreneur as the paradigm for economic and political leadership in capitalist societies, and I show that he offers a surprisingly robust resource for reconceptualizing entrepreneurship. Schumpeter theorized entrepreneurship: (1) as a phenomenon that (...) could not be exemplified by either individual persons or strictly private entities; (2) as a conceptual mechanism for analyzing change in the history of capitalism; and (3) even as evidence that political and economic leadership should not be conflated in modern democratic societies. By contextualizing Schumpeter’s discussions of the entrepreneur, I suggest that a reconsideration of Schumpeter’s actual theory of entrepreneurship would invigorate contemporary debates about the role of leadership in capitalist economies and liberal-democratic polities. (shrink)

Cet article présente une analyse croisée des contributions de Karl Marx et de Joseph Schumpeter sur la question des classes sociales. Les divergences que nous soulevons portent sur deux questions, la première nourrissant la seconde. Les deux auteurs reconnaissent tous deux l’existence de classes sociales fondées sur la hiérarchie et la discipline. Marx les conçoit sous l’angle du conflit porteur d’un changement visant à abolir la hiérarchie de classe, et de la sorte l’inscrit dans la nécessité d’une prise de (...) conscience facilitant le passage d’une classe en soi objective à une classe pour soi subjective. De son côté, Schumpeter préconise un degré significatif de discipline propre à assurer le progrès dont est porteur le capitalisme. Ainsi, alors que Marx conçoit le capitalisme comme un mode transitoire d’organisation sociale qui porte les germes de son déséquilibre et de sa disparition, c’est sous l’angle du déclin, via sa bureaucratisation, de l’innovation et donc du progrès, que Schumpeter envisage la fin programmée du capitalisme. (shrink)

Idealogically motivated responses to the Bishops' Letter have heightened the divisiveness of subsequent dialogue at the expense of its rigor. Schumpeter's metaphor of creative destruction provides a vehicle for reconciliation between advocates of politics and markets. His most distinguishing characteristic of capitalism extols its productive and dynamic properties. It underscores its relentless and unmanageable side that transforms institutional structures as well. The capitalist engine is driven by a perennial gale that creates and destroys at the same time; thus there (...) is a necessary role for both entrepreneurs and planners in a mixed economy. The bishops' call for collaboration is also subject to the Schumpeterian metaphor. Major process changes without new institutional forms are inconsistent with the historical experience of U.S. pluralist society. (shrink)

The book begins with a critique of Marx. The subtitle of part 1 is 'The Marxian Doctrine'. The most interesting parts of it are chapter 2, 'Marx the Sociologist', and chapter 3 'Marx the Economist'. Schumpeter's criticisms are well-informed and sympathetic. His sociological views are like Weber's, and he is aware of the kinship between those views and the more sophisticated versions of Marxism, such as is found in the letters Engels wrote in the 1890s. 'Nevertheless, the question arises (...) whether the economic interpretation of history is more than a convenient approximation which must be expected to work less satisfactorily in some cases than it does in others.... Social structures, types and attitudes are coins that do not readily melt. Once they are formed they persist, possibly for centuries, and since different structures and types display different degrees of this ability to survive, we almost always find that actual group and national behaviour more or less departs from what we should expect it to be if we tried to infer it from the dominant forms of the productive process... Such facts Marx did not overlook but he hardly realized all their implications.... [Feudalism] influenced conditions of production, wants and technology included But its simplest explanation is to be found in the function of military leadership previously filled by the families and individuals who (retaining that function however) became feudal landlords after the definitive conquest of the new territory. This does not fit the Marxian schema at all well and could easily be so construed as to point in a different direction. Facts of this nature can no doubt also be brought into the fold by means of auxiliary hypotheses but the necessity of inserting such hypotheses is usually the beginning of the end of a theory. Many other difficulties that arise in the course of attempts at historical interpretation by means of the Marxian schema could be met by admitting some measure of interaction between the sphere of production and other spheres of social life.. (shrink)

This paper investigates Joseph Schumpeter’s interest theory by specifically focusing on the influence of the relatively unknown author Rudolf Stolzmann. Though Schumpeter spoke about Stolzmann in his early works, the influence has so far not been part of a research paper. The aim of this paper is to show that major contents of the interest theory were developed from a critical review of Stolzmann´s “Soziale Kategorie der Volkswirtschaft”. It can be demonstrated that the definition of entrepreneurial profit and (...) the importance of a bank for interest can already be found in Stolzmann’s first book. This paper claims that Stolzmann played a certain or even a major role for the interest theory of Schumpeter. However, this does not mean that there are no differences between Schumpeter and Stolzmann in general. (shrink)

This volume contains eleven papers – some theoretical, others empirical – given at the 1986 founding meeting of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society in Augsburg. By raising questions and offering additional statistical evidence, they further stimulate interest and discussion about the kinds of intuitive ideas that Schumpeter introduced in his seminal period before World War I. Whatever may be the academic mainline trend in economics, two policy-oriented 'disequilibrium' schools have flourished and still thrive: one stresses the need (...) for social redistribution as a counterweight to a negative propensity to unemployment; the other emphasizes the explicit roles of the dynamic entrepreneur, innovation and stressful competition in stimulating economic growth. And while it is possible that the heyday of the demand-side 'age of Keynes' is passing, it also may be true that the time of the supply-side 'age of Schumpeter' is now emerging. (shrink)

La figure de l’entrepreneur est aujourd’hui utilisée dans une grande variété de discours publics. Ce travail cherche à remonter à l’une des sources théoriques de la constitution de cette figure : la théorie de l’entrepreneur de Schumpeter (1911a et 1911b). Ce retour montre que Schumpeter, dans son contexte intellectuel et théorique, est amené à importer une anthropologie philosophique en économie, celle de Nietzsche, auteur largement lu dans l’Autriche du début du xx e siècle. En transposant, à l’intérieur de (...) sa théorie économique, certaines caractéristiques majeures du grand homme créatif nietzschéen dans la figure de l’entrepreneur, Schumpeter développe une explication originale de la nature dynamique du marché et de l’évolution économique. Néanmoins il importe aussi de Nietzsche une série d’ambiguïtés, notamment en ce qui concerne l’origine de l’exceptionnalité individuelle de l’entrepreneur, et plus particulièrement de sa puissance créatrice. Une seconde ambiguïté est très largement héritée, qui concerne l’extension du modèle de l’individu entrepreneur : constitue-t-il une théorie de l’action valable pour tous les individus ou uniquement pour un type d’individus particuliers? Comment concilier exceptionnalité de l’entrepreneur et norme d’un entreprenariat pour tous? La dernière partie de ce travail s’attache ainsi à explorer ces ambiguïtés, qui apparaissent chez Schumpeter et ses successeurs, notamment Israël Kirzner. Codes JEL : B13, B25, B31, B40. (shrink)

The paper reviews links between Bernard Lonergan's theory of innovative economic growth and cycles, and the ideas of Friedrich Hayek, John Maynard Keynes, and Joseph Schumpeter. They were contemporary economists, who remain influential today. For Lonergan, although markets define what is bought and sold in an exchange economy, production decisions are more fundamental. These decisions are choices about the direction of development, the standard of living, and variations in the distribution of wealth in a modern society. The paper shows (...) how Lonergan's pure cycle theory extends mainstream theory to include a broader view of human behaviour and choice. (shrink)

The classical model of democracy that Schumpeter criticizes is manufactured out of a variety of earlier ideas, not those of any one thinker or even one school of thought. His critique of the central ideals by which he defines the model--those of the common will and the common good--remains persuasive. People's preferences are too messy and too manipulable to allow us to think that mass democracy can promote those ideals, as he defines them. Should we endorse his purely electoral (...) model of democracy then, and accept that people do not exercise any control over government? Not necessarily. We can expand democracy to include the constitutional and contestatory constraints that people impose on their rulers. We may hope that people can rely on such democratic controls to ensure that government operates by community standards. (shrink)

This paper brings about a conversation between Schumpeterian and Polanyian perspectives on markets and their central role in the capitalist economy. For Schumpeter, markets were critical to the process of selftransformation of economic activity, but in his vision, markets as such were largely taken for granted. Markets enabled the introduction of new processes and products equally as well as rendering economic activities obsolete, with the entrepreneur and firm as agents of change, generating new combinations of activities and driven by (...) the creative power of knowledge. Innovation and markets are jointly the engines of endogenous growth. For Karl Polanyi, by contrast, although markets were the central feature of the capitalist economy from the beginning of the nineteenth century, his main interest is the constant impulse for markets as institutions to expand into every aspect of social life and the countermovement of regulation to restrain what he sees as their essentially destructive nature. His focus is therefore on markets as instituted economic processes, driven by the double movement of regulation and de-regulation. He scarcely considers innovation in production or consumption, concentrating on institutions of exchange and distribution. The paper explores the two perspectives in order to ask the question that their confrontation raises: What is the relation between intra-market endogenous change and marketframework institutional change? To test out each perspective, a schematic “long-duration” empirical account of the United Kingdom food distribution markets is subjected to a Schumpeterian and Polanyian reading, and each is exposed for complementary deficits. A broader explanatory framework is sketched that proposes analysis of innovation in market institutions--especially processes exchange and distribution-- in combination with innovation in production and consumption. It is suggested that to explore the constant change of capitalist economies, these four economic domains each involve different orders of innovation and transformation that have complex feedbacks and interactions with each other. Rather than according primacy to one or other order of change, we require a complex causal account embracing multiple instituted economic processes.Cet article discute de la vision des marchés et de leur rôle central dans l’économie capitaliste selon Schumpeter et Polanyi. Pour Schumpeter, les marchés sont essentiels au processus d’auto transformation de l’activité économique, mais dans son approche il présuppose l’existence des marchés. Les marchés permettent l’introduction de nouveaux processus et produits et rendent en même temps les activités économiques obsolètes. Les marchés, avec l’entrepreneur et la firme comme agents du changement, créent de nouvelles combinaisons d’activités et sont dynamisés par le pouvoir créatif de la connaissance. L’innovation et les marchés sont conjointement les moteurs de la croissance endogène. Chez Karl Polanyi, en revanche, bien que les marchés soient un élément central de l’économie capitaliste dès le début du 19ème siècle, l’attention se porte sur le mouvement permament des marchés-institutions à s’étendre à tous les domaines de la vie sociale ainsi que sur le contre-mouvement de la régulation à limiter ce que Polanyi considère comme la nature destructrice des marchés. Son interêt se porte ainsi aux marchés comme des processus économiques établis, conduits par un double mouvement de régulation et de dérégulation. Il ne considère que rarement l’innovation de production ou de consommation, et se concentre sur les institutions de l’échange et de la distribution.L’article explore les deux visions afin de sinterroger sur ce que la confrontation des approches soulève comme question: Quelle est la relation entre les changements endogènes intra marché et les changements institutionnels de la structure de marché? Pour tester chacune des visions, un compte-rendu empirique sur longue période de la distribution alimentaire au Royaume-Uni est soumis à une lecture Schumpeterienne et Polanyienne.Un cadre explicatif plus large est esquissé et suggère une analyse de l’innovation des institutions de marché - particulièrement des processus d’échange et de distribution - conjointement à l’innovation de production et de consommation. Il est suggéré que pour analyser le changement permanent des économies capitalistes, il faut considérer les ordres d’innovation et de transformation de ces quatres domaines économiques qui connaissent des “effets de retour” ainsi des interactions. Au lieu d’accorder la primauté à un des ordres de changement, il est nécessaire de rendre compte d’une causalité complexe qui prend en compte des processus économiques multiples. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter contrasted his definition of democracy against what he called its “Classical Doctrine.” Received scholarly wisdom holds either that the classical doctrine had no real historical embodiments, or that it is a composite of historical arguments pieced together only so that Schumpeter could knock them down. Arguably, however, Schumpeter actually drew the classical doctrine from a very real source: Carl Schmitt.

The significance of the major claims of Joseph Schumpeter's best‐known work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, have often been misunderstood by readers unattuned to its ironic mode of presentation. The book reaffirms two themes that were central to Schumpeter's thought from its very beginning, namely the significance of creative and extraordinary individuals in social processes, and the resentment created by the innovations they introduce. The thesis that socialism would replace capitalism, but that it would bring about few of the (...) advantages imagined by socialists and many disadvantages with which they had not reckoned, was an ironic proposition, which Schumpeter put forth in a manner designed to overcome intellectuals’ dogmatic resistance to capitalism. (shrink)

Cet article s’inscrit dans la lignée de précédents travaux visant à rapprocher l’entrepreneur schumpétérien et le surhumain nietzschéen. Les deux partagent une créativité pouvant s’interpréter comme l’extériorisation d’un surcroît de force qui, dans l’optique nietzschéenne, s’assimile à la source extra-morale de l’accroissement de la vie. Reste à savoir si le cadre dans lequel ils évoluent est le même. Au-delà d’une approche historique du cycle de la conjoncture, notre hypothèse est que l’approche philosophique d’un cycle du devenir s’avère être féconde pour (...) une interprétation enrichie du cycle de la conjoncture, complétant et prolongeant ainsi notre interprétation du surhumain et de l’entrepreneur. (shrink)

Many believe that equality of opportunity will be achieved when the prospects of children no longer depend upon the wealth and education of their parents. The institution through which the link between child and parental prospects may be weakened is public education. Many also believe that democracy is the political institution that will bring about justice. This study, first published in 2006, asks whether democracy, modeled as competition between political parties that represent different interests in the polity, will result in (...) educational funding policies that will, at least eventually, produce citizens who have equal capacities, thus breaking the link between family background and child prospects. In other words, will democracy engender, through the educational finance policies it produces, a state of equal opportunity in the long run? (shrink)

Why concern oneself with Otto Neurath’s economic thought in its historical context? Could anything be more out of fashion than a theory proposing a centrally managed planned economy? Than the views of a theorist whose ideas on in-kind economic planning drove the notion of economic planning to its utmost extreme ? Indeed, Neurath’s ideas appeared too radical and utopian even for the social democrats of the 1920s. So why give even a second thought to them today? Would it not be (...) better to follow the advice a colleague gave me in the 1980s and to pass over Neurath’s “youthful sins” silently so as not to tarnish the reputation that – finally, after a lengthy delay – has been accredited to Neurath for his impressive philosophical achievements within the framework of logical empiricism?In the years since the 1980s, however, Neurath’s economic writings have attracted much more interest than anyone would previously have suspected. Today we are aware of the fact that Neurath formulated ideas at an unexpectedly early stage that are currently relevant in ecological economy, social choice theory and developmental economy. And that his reflections vis-à-vis “associational socialism” could provide interesting impulses for a new theory of socialism. Viewed from this perspective, Neurath’s status is secure as a precursor of theoretical developments and debates that are in full swing today. But is that enough? After all, if the role of the precursor is an endearing one, isn’t it also quite thankless? For even in the areas in which Neurath can be regarded as a precursor, the relevant questions are posed today with far greater precision and with reference to current facts – so why should anyone concern oneself with a precursor whose fundamental assumptions differ so greatly from those of the overwhelming majority of economists working today? (shrink)